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and treat  an aquifer  for  30 years.
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In the United States, the task of cleaning up hazardous  waste that was improperly
disposed  of in the past falls under the jurisdiction  of the Comprehensive  Environmental
Response,  Compensation  and Liability  Act (CERCLA),  popularly  known as the Superfund
law.  According  to the law, the U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA) is responsible
for inspecting  hazardous  waste sites, and for putting those sites that pose the most serious
contamination  problems  on a National  Priorities  List. EPA then oversees the cleanup  of
theses sites, suing potentially  responsible  parties for the costs of cleanup  when possible, and
funding  the cleanup  of "orphaned"  sites out of the Superfund,  money  raised by taxing
chemical  and petroleum  products.
The Superfund  program is among the most controversial  of U.S. environmental
programs. Cleanups  of individual  sites are extremely  costly, and questions have been raised
on whether the benefits  of cleanup are worth the costs. Crucial to this debate is the issue of
how permanent  cleanups should be. At many sites, imminent  danger of exposure to
contaminants  can be removed  at low cost. What raises the cosi of cleanup  is the decision to
clean up the site for future generations--for  instance,  to incinerate  contaminated  soil, or to
pump and treat an aquifer for 30 years.
In this study we shed light on this debate by estimating  how much EPA has been
willing to spend (or have others spend)  for more permanent  cleanups at Superfund  sites. We
infer this value by analyzing  cleanup  decisions  for contaminated  soils at 110 Superfund  sites-
all wood-preserving  sites and all sites with PCB contamination  in excess of 10 parts per
million. In addition  to inferring  EPA's willingness  to pay for more permanent  cleanups,  we
examine whether more permanent  cleanups  were selected in urban areas, or at sites with
higher baseline  risks.
We also examine the controversial  topic of risk equity.  In the United States it has
been alleged that the poor suffer the consequences  of pollution  much more than the rich.  It
has also been alleged that EPA has chosen more permanent Superfund  cleanups in areas
where residents are predominantly  white and/or have high incomes. We examine whether this
was true for sites studied  by looking  at the effect of the racial composition  and median
income of the zip code (postal  code) in which  the site was located on the cleanup chosen.
The choice of technology  to clean up contamninated  soils at a Superfund  site entails
selecting  one of three options:  capping the soil, treating it in situ, or excavating  it.  If
excavation is chosen,  EPA must decide whether the soil will be put in a landfill  or treated  in
some way (such as incineration),  and whether treatment  will occur on or off site. Combining
these options yields 6 alternatives: capping,  in situ treatment,  onsite landfill, offsite landfill.permanent, followed by landfilling  of the excavated  soil.
For each set of sites (wood-preserving  and PCB) we estimated a multinomial  logit
model to explain the likelihood  that EPA would select each of t'ie 6 cleanup  options. Two
results stand out: Other things equal, EPA was more likely to choose less expensive cleanup
options.  Costs mattered to the agency  in selecting  a cleanup strategy. The permnanence  of the
alternative,  however, also mattered: Holding  costs constant,  EPA was more likely to select
more permanent  options,  such as incineration.
The amount EPA was willing to spend for increased  permanence  was, however,  high.
The agency was willing to pay at least five times as much for onsite incineration  of
contaminated  soil as it was for capping  of the soil.  We estimate that, if a site were to contain
10,000  cubic yards of PCB-contaminated  soil, EPA would be willing to spend $12 million
(1987 dollars) more to incinerate  the soil onsite than to cap it.  At a PCB site containing
100,000  cubic yards of contaminated  soil, the agency would be willing to spend $36,000,000
more to incinerate the soil than to cap it.  The figures are similar  at wood-preserving  sites:
given a mean cost of capping of $400,000,  EPA would be willing to spend an additional $12
million to incinerate  the soil.
Regarding  risk equity, we found no evidence that the percentage  of minority  residents
near the site had any influence  on the choice of cleanup selected. We did, however,  find that
offsite treatment was more likely to be chosen at sites with higher incomes than at sites with
lower incomes. This may reflect the belief that offsite remedies are more permanent, at least
from the viewpoint  of residents near the site.
Our findings regarding  choice of remedial  action suggest  that the U.S. Environmental
Protection  Agency  is behaving  in accordance  with CERCLA: It has considered  both cost and
pennanence in choosing  among remedial  alternatives,  and has made tradeoffs between the
two.  The tradeoffs it has made, however,  indicate that the agency  is willing to pay large
sums to incinerate contaminated  soil rather ti,an capping the soil or putting it in a landfill.
These figures raise an important  question: Are the benefits  of incineration  versus capping
worth these sums?THE VALUE OF SUPERFUND  CLEANUPS: EVIDENCE FROM EPA
DECISIONMAKING
Shreekant  Gupta, George Van Houtven  and Maureen Cropper
In the U.S. there is currently a heated debate about the amount that should be
spent to clean up hazardous  waste sites.  Businesses,  complaining  that the cost of
such cleanups will put them at a competitive  disadvantage,  have argued that the
current system for cleaning  up such sites should  be reformed. Experts in risk
assessment  have argued that many of these sites pose only a small threat to human
health and the environment. Indeed, expert rankings  of environmental  problems
(USEPA 1987) place toxic waste sites sixteenth  in a list of 31 environmental
problems. By contrast, the lay public ranks toxic waste sites as the number one
environmental  problem in the U.S., ahead of nuclear accidents, pesticide residues
and the destruction  of the ozone layer (Clymer 1989).
The controversy  over hazardous wvaste  sites has in large part been caused by
the high cost of cleaning up these sites.  A recent study estimates  the average cost of
cleanup  at $27 million  per site (USEPA 1990). If there are, indeed, 10,000 such
sites the total cost of cleaning them up ($270 billion)--spread  over 20 years-would
double expenditures  on hazardous  waste disposal.
What causes the cost of cleanup  to be so high is how permanently  a site is
cleaned up.  A typical hazardous  waste sitc consists  of contaminated  surface area
(contaminated  soil, a pond into which waste was deposited)  and contaminated  ground
water.  At most sites, imminent  danger of exposure  to contaminants  can usually be2
rem, ved at low cost.  Contaminated  soil can be fenced  off or capped, and an
altemate water supply can be provided if ground water is used for drinking.  What
raises the cost of cleanup  is the decision to clean up the site for future generations--
for instance, to incinerate  contaminated  soil, or to pump and treat an aquifer for 30
years to contain a plume of pollution.
Under the Comprehensive  Emergency  Response, Compensation  and Liability
Act (CERCLA)  it is the U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency (EPA) who is
responsible  for deciding  how permanent  cleanups  at hazardous  waste sites will be, at
least at those sites which are deemed  serious  enough to be placed on the National
Priorities List (NPL).'  In choosing how to clean up contaminated  soils, EPA must
determine both how extensively  to clean up the site (i.e., how much soil to
excavate), and how permanently  to dispose of the soil.  The first of these decisions
must protect the health of persons currently living near the site regardless of cost. 2
In deciding how permanent the cleanup  will be EPA is, however, allowed to trade
off permanence  against cost.
What we examine in this paper is how EPA has made this tradeoff.  By
examining EPA's choice of cleanup  option at 110 Superfund  sites we are able to
'EPA has developed  a Hazard Ranking  System which  it uses to assess risks at
hazardous waste sites.  Those sites which receive  a sufficiently  high Hazard Ranking
System (HRS) score are put on the National Priorities  List.
21t is generally  assumed that the risk of an adverse health outcome is directly
proportional to the concentration  of the pollutant  in the soil.  The larger the volume
of soil addressed, the lower this risk.  EPA's guidance  states that enough soil must
be excavated (or capped) to reduce risk of death to no more than 1 in 10,000.3
infer the value that the agency has implicitly  attached to more permanent  cleanup
options, such as incineration  of contaminateu  soil, versus less permanent options,
such as capping of soil.  Our purpose  in doing so is to raise the question:  'Is the
value that EPA implicitly  places on more permanent  cleanups  the same value society
would place on them?"
In addition  to estimating  the value attached  by EPA to more permanent
cleanups, we wish to see what factors influence  the choice of cleanup technology.  It
is, for example, reasonable  that more permanent  cleanups  would be selected at sites
in more densely populated  areas, or that soil would  be cleaned up more permanently
if ground water contamination  were a threat.  Has this, in fact, been the case?
Finally, we wish to shed some light on an issue that has received much
attention  in the last several  years, but little careful study-the issue of environmental
equity.  Environmental  and other advocacy  groups have charged that minorities  and
the poor suffer disproportionately  from the effects  of pollution (United Church of
Christ 1987). In the case of hazardous  waste cleanups  it has been charged (Lavelle
and Coyle 1992) that EPA selects  less permanent  cleanups  in areas that have a high
percentage  of poor and/or minority  residents. These allegations  are, however, based
on simple correlations  between variables  that fail to hold other factors constant. We
wish to see whether, holding other factors constant, EPA has in fact selected less
permanent  cleanups in areas that have a high percentage  of minority residents, or
low median household  incomes.4
To examine these issues we have gathered  data on the decisions  to clean up
110 Superfund sites--all  wood preserving  sites and selected  sites with PCB
(polychlorinated  biphenyl) contamination  in excess of 10 parts per million.  We have
used the data to model the decision to clean up contaminated  soils at these sites.
The next section of the paper provides  a brief description  of the Superfund  program
and of the data we collected. Section  III presents  a discrete  choice model of the
cleanup decision.  Section  IV contains  empirical  results, and section V summarizes
our conclusions.
H.  A DESCRIPTION  OF THE DECISIONS  STUDIED
A.  An Overview of the Superfund Cleanug Process
The decisions  we have studied  were made under CERCLA, popularly klown
as the Superfund  law.  The law requires  EPA to maintain  a database  of hazardous
waste sites, 3 and to investigate  each site to determine  the seriousness  of its waste
problems.  If requifed, the site goes through  a formal hazard ranking process. This
evaluates the site's potential  to inflict damage  !hrough  three pathways-ground water,
surface water and air.  Sites are scored  on the basis of a Hazard Ranking System
(HRS), with each site receiving  a score between  0 and 100. If the score exceeds
28.5, the site is put on the National  Priorities List (NPL). 4
3The database, called CERCLIS  (Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,
Compensation  and Liability  Information  Service)  currently contains over 33,000
sites.
'At the end of FY 1992 there were over 1,200 sites on the NPL.All sites on the NPL are subject  to a Remedial  Investigation  and Feasibility
Study (RI/PS).  The Remedial  Investigation  characterizes  the wastes at the site and
assesses  the risks that the site poses to human health  and the environment. In the
Feasibility  Study, remedial  alternatives  (c!eanup  options)  are developed  And
screened.  After the RI/FS, EPA issues a Record  of Decision (ROD) which
describes  and justifies the cleanup  option selected. This is followed  by cleanup of
the site, after which it is eligible for deletion from the NPL.
At a typical Superfund  site the Feasibility  Study must address two pollution
problems: ground water contamination  and surface  contamination--contaminated
soils or sludge or contaminated  ponds. The usual method  of treating contaminated
ground water is to pump and treat the ground water.  The treated water is either
reinjected into the aquifer or discharged  into a river or stream. 5 Since the choice of
cleanup strategy for ground water varies little from one site to another, we focus on
the decision to remediate  contaminated  soils.
There are two parts to the decision  to clean up contaminated  soils at
Superfund sites--the  decision  as to how extensively  to clean up the site, and the
choice of what technology  to use.
The first decision-how extensively  to clean up the site--affects  current health
risks to residents near the site.  Typically  this decision is stated in terms of the
concentration  of contaminants  above which all soil is excavated  and/or capped.
5In some cases the use of an alternative  water supply may be chosen instead of a
pump and treat strategy.6
These concentrations  are then mapped  into a lifetime risk of death from exposure to
hazardous  substances  at the site.
In deciding which techniology  to employ to clean up the site EPA has three
options-capping the soil, treating the soil on-site (in Sit treatment)  or excavating
the soil.  Excavated soil can either be put in a landfill  (usually after treatment)  or
more thoroughly treated.  For example, soil containing  organic waste can be
incinerated. The choice of technology  is, essentially,  a decision about the
permanence  of cleanup.  The least permanent  cleanup  is not to excavate soil at all,
but to cap it.  The cleanup, in this case, will last only as long as the life of the cap,
and ground water will not be protected  from contamination. A more permanent
solution  is to excavate soil and put it in an approved  landfill.  This prevents
exposure  via ground water (and other routes) as long as the landfill liner remains
intact.  An even more permanent  solution  (assuming  pollutants  are organic) is to
incinerate the soil.
In selecting target concentrations  of pollutants, EPA's choice is restricted  in
two ways--the  concentrations  must comply with state and federal environmental
standards, and the risk of death that they imply cannot  exceed I in 10,000. In
selecting which technology  to use, however, EPA is allowed to balance the cost of
cleanup against four other cleanup  goals:  (1) permanence;  (2) short-term
effectiveness, (3) reduction of toxicity, mobility  or volume of waste through
treatment; and (4) implementability.7
3B.T  ScoRe  of the Bshd
To study  cleanup  decisions,  we were  limited  to those  sites  on the National
Priorities  List for which  Records  of Decision  (RODs)--the  document  describing  the
cleanup  strategy  chosen  by EPA--had  been  signed. Of the 945 sites  for which
RODs  had been  signed  as of the end of FY 1991,  we selected  110: 32 wood
preservirn,  sites  and 78 sites  with  PCB  contamination.'  There  are a total  of 127
RODs  for the 110  sites,  since  a single  site  may  have  more  than  one operable  unit, a
portion  of the site that is treated  separately  for purposes  of cleanup.
Wood  preserving  sites  are wood  treatment  facilities  where  pentachlorophenol
(PCP)  or creosote  was used  to pressure-treat  wood  to prevent  it from rotting. Soils
at these  sites  are contaminated  with  polyaromatic  hydrocarbons  (PAHs)-a
constituent  of creosote--which  are considered  a probable  human  carcinogen. The
PCB sites  in the sample  include  landfills,  former  manufacturing  facilities  and other
sites  where  PCBs-also  considered  probable  human  carcinogens--are  found. 7
These  sites  were selected  for two  reasons. Because  their  principal
contaminants  are carcinogenic,  estimates  of health  risks  from each  site  are more
'The 32 wood  preserving  sites  include  all wood  preserving  sites  for which  RODs
had been  signed  as of FY 1991. The 78 sites  with  PCB  contamination  were selected
from those  sites  with  PCB  contamination  in excess  of 10 ppm for which  RODs  had
been  signed  as of FY 1991.
7PCBs  are a group  of toxic  chemicals  that, prior to being  banned  in 1979,  were
used  is e.ectrical  transformers,  hydraulic  fluids,  adhesives  and caulking  compounds.
They  are extremely  persistent  in the envirm-iment  because  they  are stable,  non-
reactive  and highly  heat  resistant.8
likely to be available  than for sites whose pollutants  are not carcinogenic. Second,
because both sets of sites contain organic  pollutants,  the technological  options
available for cleanup are similar at both sets of sites.
For each site (more accurately,  for each operable  unit), data were gathered
from the Record of Decision on the set of cleanup  alternatives  considered  and on the
characteristics  of the site.  For each cleanup  option considered,  we would like to
know the cost of the option and the permanence  of the option. While data on the
cost of each option are available, the permanence  of each option is not reported in
the Record of Decision; however, we have developed  a scheme to characterize  the
permanence  of each cleanup  option which is described  below.
C.  A Classification Scheme for Cleanup Options
Our classification  of cleanup  options is based on two aspects of each cleanup
altemative:  whether the alternative  involves  excavation  of contaminated  soil, and
whether the alternative  involves  treatment  of the contaminated  soil.  In addition, we
distinguish  whether remedies that entail excavation  are conducted  on-site or off-site.
Combining these choices yields a total of six categories  of remedial  alternatives: (1)
on-site treatment  of soil that has been excavated  (on-site  treatment); (2) off-site
treatment of soil that has been excavated  (off-site  treatment); (3) disposal  of
excavated but untreated soil in a landfill on the site (on-site landfll); (4) disposal  of
excavated but untreated  soil in a landfill  off the site (off-site  landfill); (5) on-site9
treatment  of soil that has not been excavated  (in  jf  treatment)'; (6) containment  of
soil that has been neither excavated  or treated (containment).
The six categories  are pictured  in Figure 1.  Table 1 lists, for wood
preserving  and PCB sites, the number  of times each category was considered and
selected, and the unit cost of cleanup  options within each category. 9 Of the six
categories, on-site  and off-site treatment  correspond  to the most permanent cleanups.
According  to the 1986  amendments  to the Superfund  Law (the SARA  amendments),
EPA is supposed  to show a preference  for treatment,  as opposed to non-treatment
alternative~..  We have also distinguished  whether  disposal  and/or treatment of
excavated  soil occurred on- or off-site  because  of the controversy  surrounding  off-
site cleanups. Off-site  cleanups  are often favored  by persons  living near a
Superfund  site, since they are perceived  as a permanent  solution to the problem.
The SARA amendments,  however, indicate  a preference  for on-site, as opposed to
off-site remedies. We wish to see whether  EPA has, in fact, exhibited  such a
preference.
Table 1 illustrates  the magnitude  of the permanence-cost  tradeoff facing
environmental  officials. The average  cost of the least permanent  options--
containment  and on-site landfill--is  approximately  one order of magnitude  smaller
than the average cost of on-site  treatment. Nevertheless,  on-site  treatment was the
SThis  includes  flushing of soil to remove  contaminants  and bioremediation--the
use of bacteria to neutralize  toxic substances.
9AII six categories  may not be considered  at a site, whereas some, such as on-
site treatment, may be considered more than once.10
most preferred of the six cleanup  categories: It was selected  73 percent of the time
at wood preserving sites and 62 percent of the time at PCB sites.  For this reason
on-site treatment has been further broken down into three categories-incineration,
innovative  treatment and solidification/stabilization.
D.  Variables  that May Influence  the  CleanuR  Decision
In addition to gathering  data on cleanup  options, we assembled  data on
variables that might influence  the choice of cleanup  option at a site.  These are listed
in Table 2, together with summary  statistics. The variables  fatl into three
categories: characteristics  of the site (baseline  risk, HRS score, size of the site and
where it is located); characteristics  of the population  living near the site (percent of
the population  that is non-white, median  income of the population)  and two
miscellaneous  variables, the year in which the ROD was signed  and Fund Lead.
Since EPA sometimes  sets priorities on the basis of baseline risks, we have
gathered data on baseline  risks at each site.  The baseline  risk associated  with each
site measures  the lifetime risk of cancer to the "maximally  exposed individual' from
all exposure pathways,  assuming that nothing is done to clean up the site.'0 This
may be disaggregated  into risk attributable  to direct contact  with contaminated  soil,
and risk attributable to exposure to contaminated  ground water.
'"Me  "maximally  exposed individual"  may be a child who ingests contaminated
soils, a person working at a still-active  site, or a resident living within the
boundaries of the site.11
Two features of baseline  risk are worth noting. First, the risk of cancer at
the sites studied comes primarily from contaminated  ground water, rather than from
direct contact with contaminated  soil.  Second, the magnitude  of the lifetime cancer
risks from these sites-a  1 in 5 chance  of contracting  cancer from a single sitel-
reflects the extremely  conservative  assumptions  used to estimate exposure.
While baseline risk is the formal measure  of hazards  posed by the site prior
to cleanup, it is possible that the agency  is also influenced  by the HRS score, a
measure of the relative risk posed by sites, but not a quantitative  estimate of risk.  It
would be ironic if cleanup  decisions  were influenced  by HRS score-a quick-and-
dirty estimate of the hazards  posed by a site-but not by more careful (and
expensive)  estimates  of baseline  risk."
The size of a site may also influence  the nature of the cleanup chosen.
While the main influence  of size should  be felt through cost (arge  sites, being more
expensive to clean up, may receive less permanent  cleanups)  it is possible that size-
measured here by the volume  of contaminated  soil at the site-may exert an
independent  effect.  In particular, if short-term  risks associated  with cleanup are
proportional to the volume of soil excavated,  excavation  may be less likely to be
"Throughout our analysis  we use a modified  version of tie HRS score that
combines  the surface and ground water components  of the score, but eliminates  the
air score.  It is often the case that the air score is not computed for a site if the
ground water and/or surface water scores  are sufficient  to put the site over the
threshold for inclusion  on the NPL.  It is unfortunately  impossible  to distinguish  the
case of a zero air score from cases where the air score was never computed, hence
we eliminate  it from consideration.12
chosen the larger the site.  Location  of a site in an urban area (a proxy for
population density) may exert a similar effect.
The two population  characteristics--Percent  Non-White  and Median  Income--
are included to test the hypothesis  that EPA selects  less permanent  cleanups  at sites
in poor and/or minority areas.  Both variables  are measured  for the Zip Code in
which the site is located, and are based on 1990 Census  data.
The year in which the ROD was signed  may exert an influence  on the type of
cleanup chosen if EPA is sensitive  to the 1986  amendments  to CERCLA (the SARA
amendments).  As noted above, these call for EPA to give preference  to treatment
options and to on-site disposal  of waste.
The final variable in Table 2, "Fund Lead," indicates  who was in charge of
conducting  the RI/FS at the site.  Although  the regional  EPA administrator  is
ultimately responsible  for selecting  a cleanup  strategy for a site, the Risk
Investigadon  and Feasibility  Study (RI/FS) that precedes  the choice of cleanup
strategy may be conducted  either by the EPA (at a "Fund-lead"  site) or by the
parties responsible for cleaning  up the site (the "potentially  responsible  parties") at a
PRP-lead site.  It is sometimes  thought that the party responsible  for the site
investigation  can influence  the menu of alternatives  considered  for cleanup, and,
hence, the cleanup option selected  at the site.13
m.  A MODEL OF THE CHOICE OF CLEANUP OPTION
At a typical  Superfund  site, from 3 to 12 cleanup  options may be considered
in the Feasibility  Study, from which the regional  EPA administrator  must select one.
We assume that this decision is made to maximize  the net benefits of cleanup,
broadly defined.  The net benefits of cleanup  option i  are a function of the risk
reduction the option achieves, the permanence  of the option and its cost.
Unfortunately  the risk reduction  achieved  by each cleanup  option is not reported in
the RI/FS.  We describe the permanence  of the option by a vector of dummy
variables, T,  that correspond  to the categories  in Figure 1.12  This implies that the
net benefits of option i  are given by
B=  a + bCost 1 +  DT; + e;  (1)
where Cost; is the cost of the cleanup  option i  and  e, represents  the unobserved
components  of net benefits. We assume e1 is independently  and identically
distributed  for all  i  with a Type I Extreme Value distribution, so that the choice of
cleanup option is described  by a multinomial  logit model.
If the coefficient  of Cost;  is significant  and negative, and the coefficient  of
the on-site treatment  dummy is significant  and positive, then EPA has indeed
balanced cost against permanence  in its selection  of cleanup  option.  In this case one
'2In the estimating  equation  at most 5 of these categories  can be used, since a
constant terms is included  in the equation.14
can compute the rate at which EPA was willing  to substitute  cost for permanence  to
determine an implicit willingness  to pay (or have polluters  pay) for increased
permanence. Formally, one can ask how much costs may be increased while
changing the cleanup option from containment  to on-site treatment, and keep net
benefits constant.  Let  Costo represent  the cost of containing  waste at a site,  do
the coefficient  of the containment  dummy and  d,  the coefficient  of the on-site
treatment dummy.  W,, the most EPA would pay for on-site  treatment, is defined
implicitly by  do + b Costo = d, + b W,.
An elaboration  of equation  (1) is to allow the coefficients  of Cost and the
technology  dummies to depend  on site characteristics,  implying that site
characteristics  should be interacted  with the independent  variables  in (1).  For
example, if, as alleged  by Lavelle and Coyle (1992), EPA has a preference for less
permanent cleanups  in areas with a significant  minority population,  then the
coefficient  on the permanence  dummies  will be a function of Percent Non-White.
Likewise, site characteristics  (e.g., Median  Income, Baseline  Risk) may alter the
disutility attached to cost.
One final point.  In categorizing  a remedial  alternative  according to the
scheme presented in Figure 1 we must face the fact that a cleanup  option may
involve the use of a combination  of technologies. It may, for example, call for
capping a relatively benign portion of a site while excavating  and incinerating  the
most contaminated  soil.  In the case of wood preserving  sites this is handled by
categorizing the remedial  alterative  according  to the primary technology  used, i.e.,15
the one applied to the majority  of contaminated  soil at the operable unit, and then by
including  a dummy  variable to indicate  that a secondary  treatment  was applied to the
rest of the unit.  At PCB sites the part of the site receiving  primary treatment is the
only part of the site studied, hence each remedial  alternative  corresponds  to a unique
category in Figure 1.
IV.  THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY AT SUPERFUND  SITES
Separate  equations  were estimated  to explain the remedial  alternative selected
at wood preserving sites and at PCB sites.  In examining  these results we focus on
hree questions: (1) Did costs matter to EPA in its choice of cleanup  option?  Thal
is, was the agency more likely to select  an inexpensive  cleanup  than an expensive
one, other things equal?  (2) Did EPA show a preference  for more permanent
cleanups, and, if so, how much was it willing to pay for them?  (3) Did EPA's
propensity  to select one option rather than another  vary with site characteristics?
A.  The Choice of Technolo=r at Wood Preservi  Sites
Table 3 presents the model for wood preserving  sites.  Two results stand out.
First, in most specifications,  EPA is less likely to choose a cleanup option the more
costly it is.  Costs da matter in determining  which technology  to use in cleaning up
a wood preserving site.  Second, EPA has demonstrated  a clear preference for on-
site excavation and treatment  at wood prwserving  sites.16
Both results appear clearly in column I of Table 3, which explains the choice
of cleanup option solely as a function  of cost and of the technology  dummies.  The
logarithm of cost is significant  and negative, indicating  that the higher the cost of a
cleanup option, the less likely it is to be chosen. Of the five technology  dummies
described  above (containment  is the omitted category), only on-site excavation  and
treatment is statistically  significant. This implies that EPA was willing to pay
significantly  more for on-site excavation  and treatment,  the most permanent
technology, as compared to capping; however, it was willing to pay no more for the
other four categories  in Figure 1 than for capping.
Columns 2 and 3 of the table present, respectively,  a more detailed and a less
detailed characterization  of cleanup  options. Column 2 disaggregates  on-site
excavation and treatment into three categories--incineration,  solidification,  and
innovative treatment. While each of the three categories  is statistically  significant--
EPA is willing to pay a premium for any one of them relative to capping--their
coefficients  are not significantly  different from one another.  A comparison  of
columns i and 3 likewise indicates  that the coefficients  for the two off-site options
are not significantly  different from one another.
The remainder of the table interacts site characteristics  with log cost and with
the technology  dummies.  Secondary  treatment (the use of more than one treatment
technology)  is more likely to be used the higher the percent of minority residents
near the site, and costs matter less in remedy selection  over time.  We emphasize,
however, that there is no evidence  in Table 3 that EPA selected  less permanent17
remedies in areas with a large minority  population,  or in low-income  areas.  AU
interactions  between the permanence  dummies  and either race or income are
insignificant.
The second result-that costs matter less than over time-accords with the
spirit of the SARA amendments,  i.e., that EPA should  give more weight to
permanent remedies  rather than to costs in choosing  a cleanup  option.  However, a
strict test of the amendments-interacting  the post-SARA  dummy with on-site
excavation and treatment--does  not yield significant  results.
One of the implications  of Table 3 and of alternate specifications  not reported
in the table is that the weight  attached to cost and to the technology  dummies  seems
to vary little with site characteristics: EPA's propensity  to choose one cleanup
option over another was consistent  across sites.  In particular, it was unaffected  by
whether the site was located  in an urban area, by baseline  risk or by risk of ground
water contamination.
The Value of More Peranent  CleanuR  Ogtions
Since costs and permanence  are both statistically  significant  in explaining the
cleanup option chosen, one can compute  the rate at which EPA was willing to
substitute  cost for permanence  to detennine  an implicit  willingness  to pay (or have
polluters pay) for increased permanence. Formally, one can ask how much costs
can be increased  while changing  the cleanup  option from containment  to on-site
excavation and treatment,  and keep net benefits constant.18
Column 1 of Table 3 implies that, at a site where capping would cost
$400,000 (1987 dollars), EPA would be willing to spend an additional  $11.4 million
to incinerate the soil.  Its willingness  to pay for on-site  innovative  treatment  or
stabilization  (over the cost of capping)  is about half as much ($5 million and $5.7
million, respectively).
It is important  to emphasize  what these implicit  valuations  measure. The
$11.4 million value attached to incineration  in not simply the difference in cost
between on-site incineration  and capping  at sites where incineration  was chosen.
Indeed, this cost difference, $21.2 million  - $0.4 million (see Table 1), is greater
than the valuation  implied by Table 3.  What Table 3 reflects is that EPA
sometimes  chose not to incinerate  soil, even when it was relatively inexpensive  to do
so.  This lowers the implicit valuation  of the option below average cost at sites
where it was chosen.
B.  The Choice of Technology at PCB Sites
Table 4 presents models  of the choice of cleanup  option at PCB sites.  At
PCB sites costs clearly play a role in the selection  of cleanup technology-in all
columns of Table 4 more expensive  technologies  are less likely to be selected, other
things equal.  The disutility attached to cost is, however, less at larger sites (up to
15,000 cubic yards) than at smaller sites.' 3 This implies, other things equal, that
*  '3Interacting volume and cost produces insignificant  results at wood preserving
sites.19
excavation  and treatment of waste  at two small sites is valued more highly than an
excavation and treatment option at a single large site.  A possible  rationale for this
is the belief that more people will benefit from cleanups  at two small sites than from
a cleanup at a single large site.
Table 4 also suggests that EPA is willing  to pay more for more permanent
cleanups  at PCB sites.  Of all the categories  in Figure 1, on-site treatment (in
practice, on-site  incineration)  is clearly the most valuable--its  coefficient  exceeds that
of the other technology  dummies  in all equations.' 4 In fact, equation (1) implies that
EPA was willing to pay $33.5 million  (1987 dollars) more for on-site  treatment than
it was willing to pay to contain the waste or treat it mi 'imU."
Off-site treatment (in practice,  off-site incineration)  was nearly as valuable as
on-site treatment. It is the second most preferred  technology  in all equations in the
table, and commands  a value in equation  (1) of $22.3 million, relative to non-
excavation cleanups. The fact that off-site  treatment  is somewhat  less valuable than
on-site treatment  reflects the fact that it was chosen less often than on-site treatment,
which accords with the spirit of the SARA  amendments.
It is not surprising  that EPA is willing to pay more for the two treatment
alternatives  than for other cleanups-excavation  and treatment  (usually incineration)
"This is clearly true by inspection  in equations  (I) and (2).  In equations (3)
through (9) it is also true if one evaluates  the coefficients  of the technology  dummies
at different volumes of waste.
"The excluded category  in Table 4 is non-excavation  cleanups, which include
both containment  of waste and in sit  treatment. The two categories  were combined
because in situ treatment is rarely considered  at PCB sites.20
of contaminated  soil is the most permanent  method of disposing  of PCBs.  What is,
perhaps, surprising is that disposing  of waste  In an off-site  landfill--a less permanent
alternative-is valued about as highly as off-site  incineration. The value of an off-
site landfill (relative to non-excavation)  is $25.3  million  in equation (1)--
approximately  the same value as off-site  treatment. Indeed, the hypothesis  that the
two cleanup  options have identical  coefficients  (compare  equations (3) and (4))
cannot be rejected.  A plausible  explanation  for this is that EPA's preferences  reflect
those of local residents, who view all cleanups  that remove waste from the site as
equally permarer.t.
Off-site landfills are clearly  valued more highly than on-site  landfills.  The
latter category is valued no more highly than non-excavation  cleanups  in equations
(1) and (2).
The Effect of Site Characteristics on Choice of TechnolopV
In equations (3) through (10) the values attached to treatment  and to off-site
disposal are allowed to vary with volume of waste at the site.  In all cases the value
attached to treatment or to a landfill  decreases  with the size of the site.  A possible
rationale for this finding is  that at large sites excavation  of soil will expose more
people to short-term hazards than at small sites.  Cleanup options involving
excavation are therefore less attractive  at large sites Ahan  at small sites.
When volume of waste is interacted with the technology dummies, on-site
treatment still remains the most preferred of the six cleanup technologies  at all waste21
volumes in the sample.  Off-site  disposal  (there is no difference in the value attached
to off-site landfills versus off-site treatment)  is the second-most  preferred option at
sites of 50,00(G  cubic yards or less.
With the exception  of volume, the choice of cleanup  option at PCJ  sites is
relatively unaffected  by site characteristics  (see equations  (4) - (10)).  In particular,
the allegation that EPA has selected  less permanent  cleanups  in poor and/or minority
areas appears false.  Interactions  of median income  and percent non-white with the
technology  dummies (see (8) and (9)) are insignificant  at conventional  levels."  The
only interaction  term that is marginally  significant  is the product of  =r ca"i1a
income and the off-site  dummy.  This suggests  a preference  for off-site treatment in
neighborhoods  with higher per capita incomes.
The only variable that is significant  when interacted  with the technology
dummies  is HRS score:  EPA was more likely to choose on-site treatment  at a site
the higher its  HRS score.  This result may be consistent  with conventional
economic theory.  If more permanent  cleanups  result in greater reduct;ons  in health
risks, this result implies that greater risk reductions  are being selected at sites with
higher baseline risks--a result consistent  with the value of life literature (Jones-Lee
1974).
"In contrast to wood preserving  sites, at PCB sites the disutility attached to cost
appears to be unaffected  by either the racial composition  of the population  living
near the site, by median income or by the SARA  amendments  (results available from
the authors).22
The Value of More Permanent CleanuDs
Because  Table 4 indicates  that EPA is willing  to pay more for more
permanent cleanups, it is interesting  to see exactly how large these valuations  are.
Figure 2 shows the value attached to different cleantup  options by size of site, based
on column (2) of Table 4.  At a 10,000  cubic yard site, EPA would  be willing to
pay $12.1 million (1987 dollars) to treat waste  on-site rather than contain it.  For
sites with 15,000 or more yards of contaminated  waste; however, this figure jumps
to $36.5 million."  The values attached to off-site  treatment (compared  to
containment)  are almost as large--$l  1.9 million for sites of 10,000  cubic yards and
$35.8 milkion  for sites in excess of 15,000  cubic yards.
Off-site disposal  of excavated  soil is also valued  positively by the agency-
indeed, the value of transporting  waste  off-site rather than containing  it on-site is
$8.25 million  at a site of 10,000 cubic yards and $24.8 million  at a site containing
25,000 cubic yards of waste.  This implies  that the agency  implicitly  valued off-site
landfilling of waste more than on-site landfllling  (whose  coefficient  is not
significantly  different from zero), an interesting  result in view of the preference of
the SARA Amendments  for on-site  disposal. The more important  question that
Figure 2 raises, however, is whether the implicit  valuations  of more permanent
cleanups  agree with amounts that society would  be willing to pay for these cleanups.
'7RecaII  that the interaction  of cost with log(volumel) implies that the effect of
volume stops at volumes of 15,000 cubic yards. That is, the disutility attached te
cost at sites of 15,001 cubic yards is the same as the disutility at sites of 50,000
cubic yards.23
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The answer to the question "How  does EPA select  cleanup options at
Superfund sites?" has several  parts.  First, at the sites we studied the agency did
consider cost in determining  how permanently  to clean up a site.  Other things
equal, EPA was less likely to select a remedial  alternative  the more expensive  it
was.  At PCB sites, however, this aversion  to cost decreased  as the size of the site
increased.
Second, the agency was willing to pay more for excavation  and treatment of
waste--the  most permanent  cleanup  option-than it was willing  to pay to contain
(e.g., cap) the waste.  Landfilling  of waste--a  less permanent  altemative than
treatment-was valued more highly than capping at PCB sites, but not at wood
preserving sites.  As far as the choice between  off-site  and on-site disposal is
concerned, the agency was willing to pay more at PCB sites (but not at wood
preserving sites) to dispose of waste off-site  rather than on-site, in spite of the
preference the agency is supposed  to give to on-site  disposal.
In many ways, the most interesting  result of the study is a negative one:
Despite allegations  to the contrary, there is no indication  that EPA has a preference
for less permanent  remedies  in areas with a sizable minority  population  (as measured
by percent of the population  that is non-white)  or in poor areas (as measured by
median household  income). Neither variable  had a significant  effect on the
permanence  of the remedy chosen, although  there was a marginally  significant24
tendency for off-site remedies  to be chosen more often in areas with higher per
capita incomes.
The lack of significance  of race and median  income in explaining  cleanup
decisions  is mirrored  by other site characteristics: Few variables are significantly
related to the choice of cleanup  option.
The exceptions  to this rule are health risks posed by the site and the year in
which the ROD was signed. At PCB sites the agency was wiling to spend more and
had a preference for more permanent  remedies  at sites with higher HRS scores.
These results agree with Hird (1990)  who found that sites on the NPL with high
HRS scores had RODs signed sooner than sites with low HRS scores.  Moreover,
more money was likely to be allocated to a site the higher its HRS score.
The fact that costs mattered  less at wood preserving  sites over time accords
with the spirit of the SARA amendments,  i.e.,  that EPA should give more weight  to
permanent  remedies rather than to costs in choosing  a cleanup  option.  Attaching
less weight to costs implicitly  raises the value placed on on-site excavation and
treatment.
While most of the results reported here suggest that EPA has been fulfilling
its mission  in selecting Superfund  cleanups, at least one aspect of the results is
disquieting.  The value attached to more permanent  cleanup  options, such as on-site
excavation and treatment of waste, is huge. The premium that the agency is willing
to pay for on-site incineration  of waste (over and above the cost of capping it) is $12
million (1987 dollars) at small (10,000 cubic year) sites and up to $40 million at25
large (25,000 cubic yard) sites.  What must be asked is whether the benefits of more
permanent  cleanups-such as those achieved  by the incineration  of contaminated  soil-
-are worth the amount the agency  is willing to pay for them. To answer this
question it will first be necessary  to define  and then  value the benefits of alternative
waste disposal  technologies. In view of the size of the resources  devoted to
Superfund cleanups, this is research  that deserves  the very highest  priority.26
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CLEANUP OPTIONS CONSIDERED  AND SELECTED  AND THEIR AVERAGE  COST
MEAN COST (a)  WOOD SITES  PCB SITES
PER UNIT  TOTAL  N  MEAN  STD DEV  N  MEAN  STD  DEV
REMEDIAL  OPTIONS  CONSIDERED  ($(cub  yd)  (S  million)  VOLUME  OF VOL.  VOLUME  OF VOL.
(cubic  yards)  (cubic  yards)
EXCAVATION  ONSITE  LANDFELL  144  6.1  16  36053  28754  29  45877  59593
ALTERMATIVES  OFFSllE  LANDFILL  619  7.9  15  18136  14692  50  77058  224229
OFFSITE  TREATMENT  1428  45.5  19  38351  37896  33  26235  61115
ONSITE TREATMENT  350  13.1  85  44881  48097  156  55555
(i) ONSrTE  INCINERATION  555  22.0  29  40639  38508  67  53577  110364
(ii) ONSrrE INNOVATIVE  252  9.7  45  42826  38281  58  44535  50326
(iii) ONSrrE SIS (b)  211  3.9  11  20038  21282  31  80450  267022
NON-EXCAVATION  IN SITU TREATMENT  232  11.3  12  42262  38312  11  45810
ALTERNATIVES  CONTAIMENT  79  3.5  23  46549  46355  36  128850  282599
TOTAL  430  14.2  170  41536  43030  315  63042  1
RlEMEDIAL  OPTIONS  SELECTED
EXCAN'ATION  ONSITE LANDFILL  67  3.4  2  34875  15380  6  42050  69324
ALTERNATIVES  OFFSrSE  LANDFILL  763  4.8  3  14651  20118  13  9079  10110
OFFSITE TREATMENT  655  17.5  1  26733  - 4  534  446
ONSITE TREATMENT  329  10.9  29  36529  45624  54  32905
(i) ONSrrE INCINERATION  486  21.2  8  39627  34510  22  34298  33103
(ii)  ONSrTE  INNOVATIVE  267  8.0  16  32127  33628  18  32295  30903
(iii) ONSrTE  S/S (b)  279  3.7  5  11924  6598  14  31501  33841
NON-EXCAVATION  IN SrrU  TREATMENT  142  7.6  2  66150  62013  1  149000  -
ALTERNATIVES  CONTAINMENT  31  0.4  3  35733  42287  9  421222  467160
TOTAL  325  9.3  40  36856  42920  87  69993  189503
(a) The cost figures  refer to wood  preserving  sites only and are in 1987 prices.
(b)  S/S = Stabilization/SolidificationTABLE  2
VARIABLES  THAT MAY  INFLUENCE  THE CHOICE  OF REMEDIAL  ALTERNATIVES
Wood  Preserving  Sites  PCB  Sites
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.
Baseline  Current  Risk  33  0.019  0.043  0  0.14  55  0.007  0.020  0  0.12
Baseline  Future  Groundwater  Risk  19  0.360  0.603  2.4E-06  1.6  34  0.208  0.591  IE-05  3.4
Baseline  Future  Soil Risk  20  0.038  0.062  IE-05  0.1701  30  0.010  0.044  7E-06  0.24
Recalculated  HRS  Score  40  45.255  10.532  18.61  71.46  87  50.33  13.94  8.85  74.30
Volume  of Contamination  (cub  yds)  40  36856  42920  84.15  211000  87  69993  189503  5  1509000
Urban  Setting  Dummy  Variable  40  0.125  0.335  0  1  87  0.195  0:399  0  1
Petcent Non-white  40  19.85  17.878  0.516  69.04  87  0.141  0.233  0  0.935
Median  Household  Income  (S)  40  27493  11874  12210  74620  87  30349  11709  8991  64641
Per Capita  Income  (S)  40  12814  5837.5  5496  42100  87  13316  4139  6782  28865
Year  ROD  Signed  40  88.325  1.608  85  91  87  87.99  2.03  83  91
Fund  Lead  Dummy  Variable  40  0.325  0.474  0  1  87  0.609  0.491  0  1TABLE  3
CHOICE  OF REMEDIAL  ACTION  AT WOOD  PRESERVING  SITES
VAiUABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  VARIABLE  (4)  VARIABLE  (5)  VARIABLE  (6)
LOG  COST  (1987 )  .0.694  40.909  40.699  -3.74  o.778  0.001
(-2.39)  (-2.50)  (-2.43)  (-2.39)  (-1.47)  (0001)
LOG  COST  * TREND  0.497  LOG  COST  * RACE  -0.002  LOG  COST  * INCOME  -2.7ES05
(2.08)  (.0.1  1)  (4.72)
ONS1TE  LANDFI.L  0.536  0.749  0.537  5.125  2.447  1.531
(D.51)  (0.68)  (0.51)  (1.27)  (1.18)  (0.43)
OFFSrME  LANDFILL  1.291  1.701  _
(1.08)  (1.32)  1244  S511  -. U5  2.656
OFFSRIT TREATMENT  1.133  1.627  (J09  [13J  L4(.
(0.77)  (1.05)
ONSME  EXCAVATION 2.290  F2.301  7.213  22639
& TREATMENT  |-4I  )  (1.7) II  (131)  |  LJ(1
Os n4c1N33A11  3.126
(2.48)
)  sOwDilcVAO  2.523
STAWUZAfl  (2.20)
(Ii)  INNOVATWE  2.419
TElNMENT  (2.44)
IN SrT  TREATMENT  1.088  1.306  1.096  5.306  0.527  5.448
(0.93)  (1.08)  (D.94)  (0.70)  (0.25)  (1.24)
SECONDARY  1.380  1.551  1.389  5.445  4.4R3  0.961
TREATMENT  (1.97)  (2.11)  (1.99)  (1.81)  (4.4)  (0.48)
ONSTM  LANDFILL  -1.0  ONSITE  LANDFILL  *  0.315  ONSITE  LANDFLL  *  -2E45
TREND  (4.96)  RACE  (40.95)  INCOME  (.0.22)
OFFSITE  REMEDIES  -0.72  OFFSITE  REMEDIES  *  0.134  OFFSITE  REMEDIES  *  -3.4E05
TREND  (-1.11)  RACE  (1.32)  INCOME  (-0.25)
ONSITE  EXCAVATION  4.75  ONSITE  EXCAVATION  0.014  ONSrIE  EXCAVATION  -3.4E45
&  TREATMENT  * TREND (-1.24)  & TREATMEN4T  * RACE  (0.17)  & TREATMENT  * INCOME  (4.30)
IN SITU  TREATMENT  -0.65  IN  SITU  TREATMENT  *  0.04  IN  STIU  TREATMENT  *  4.0002
TREND  (4.57)  RACE  (0.48)  INCOME  (4.89)
SECONDARY  41.58  SECONDARY  0.103  SECONDARY  1.2E45
TREATMENT  * TREND  (-1.32)  TREATMENT  * RACE  (1.83)  TREATMENT  * INCOME  (0.17)
LOG  LJJHMOOD.  44.12  .436  .44.12  -39.9  -39.4  42M.69
(1-aties in parenhss)
Coeficis  in  boldface  repee  agregted  cateories.
TREND: Year  ROD  signed  (1983=1).
RACE: Percent  non-white  population  in the zip code where e site is locaed.
INCOME:  Median  housebold  icome in the zip  coJe where  the sife  is lcatd.TABLE  4
CHOICE  OF REMEDIAL  ACTION  AT PCB  SITES
'VARIABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  VARLABLE  (4)  (5)  (6)
COST (a)  -0.08  -4.07  -3.49  COST  -3.48  -3.41  -3.50
(-3.73)  (-3.09)  (-2.18)  (-2.6)  (-2.55)  (-2.62)
COST  *  0.42  0.36  COST  0.36  0.35  0.34
LVOLI  (b)  (3.03)  (2.14)  LVOLI  (2.56)  (2.48)  (2.46)
COST  *  0.93
CURRENT  SOIL RISK (c)  (1.56)
COST  *  0.01
CURRENT  SOIL  RISK  (0.17)
MISSING  DUMMY
COST *  0.002
HRS SCORE (d)  (1.58)
OFFSITE  2.10  2.08  32.71  OFFSITE  32.88  32.30  37.73
LANDFILL  (2.76)  (2.75)  (2.55)  (2.56)  (2.47)  (2.74)
OFFSITE  1.85  2.99  35.76
TREATMENT  (1.95)  (2.76)  (2.7)
ONSITE  0.89  0.51  26.54  ONSlTE  26.43  26.10  31.64
LANDFILL  (3.73)  (0.68)  (2.02)  LANDFILL  (2.01)  (1.96)  (2.21)
ONSITE  2.78  3.05  25.24  ONSITE  25.09  24.31  29.78
TREATMENT  (3.93)  (4.29)  (2.02)  TREATiENT  (2.01)  (1.91)  (2.24)
OFFSITE LANDFILL  -2.98  OFFSITE  -3.00  -2.94  -3.42
* LOQ VOLUME  (-2.51)  * LOG  VOLUME  (-2.54)  (-2.44)  (-2.73)
OFFSITE TREATMENT  -3.40
* LOG VOLUME  (-2.63)
ONS1TE  LANDFILL  -2.43  ONSITE  LANDFILL  -2.42  -2.38  -2.89
5 LOG VOLUME  (-2.01)  * LOG VOLUME  (-2.0)  (-1.94)  (-2.21)
ONSITE  TREATMENT  -2.06  ONSITE  TREATMENT  -2.05  -1.95  -2.45
a LOG VOLUME  (-1.82)  * LOG VOLUME  (-1.8)  (-1.68)  (-2.05)
LOG LJXELIHOOD:  -79.15  -71.63  -62.88  -63.51  -62.73  -62.11
t-ri  i  paissidfms
a-WiTs  of 1987 S's
bI1  - mini iog(vohoe . log(15.000)  ), volume  is  in cubic  yards
c - czs  Jifeime  cuat  risk, plausible  maximum  case
d -flard  Ranking  System  score  (air route score not  included)TABLE  4 (continued)
CHOICE  OF REMEDIAL  ACTION  AT PCB  SITES
VARIABLE  (7)  VARIABLE  (8)  VARIABLE  (9)
COST  -3.44  4.18  -3.41
(-2.55)  (-2.66)  (-2.56)
COST *  0.35  0.43  0.35
LVOLI  (2.49)  (2.62)  (2.51)
OFFSITE  40.34  33.88  31.87
(2.60)  (2.43)  (2.32)
ONSITE  34.42  29.61  27.94
LANDFILL  (2.14)  (2.05)  (1.92)
ONSITE  30.98  26.00  24.48
TREATMENT  (2.07)  (1.90)  (1.84)
OFFSITE  -3.88  -3.09  -3.15
L  OG VOLUME  (-2.61)  (-2.4)  (-2.52)
ONSITE  LANDFILL  -3.33  -2.62  -2.48
* LOG VOLUME  (-2.15)  (-2.03)  (-1.98)
ONSITE  TREATMENT  -2.90  -2.15  -2.16
*  LOG VOLUME  (-2.02)  (-1.76)  (-1.81)
OFFSITE  0.05  OFFSITE  *  0.01  OFFSITE  *  0.13
* HRS  (0.91)  % NON-WHITE  (0.14)  MEDIAN  HH INCOME  (0.49)
ONSITE LANDFILL  0.05  ONSITE  LANDFILL  *  -0.20  ONSITE  LANDFILL  *  -0.05
* HRS  (0.75)  % NON-WHITE  (-1.30)  MEDIAN  HH INCOME  (-0.15)
ONSITE  TREATMENT  0.08  ONSITE  TREATMENT  *  0.04  ONSITE  TREATMENT  *  0.10
* HRS  (1.75)  % NON-WHITE  (0.39)  MEDIAN HH INCOME  (0.41)
LOG  LIKELIHOOD:  -61.47  -60.85  -63.21
t- ratios in pareitheseFIGURE 1:  REMEDIAL  ALTERNATIVES  FOR SOIL CONTAMINATION
onsite  treatment
treatment  /  offsite  treatment
excavation  - <  /  offsite  landfill
/  ~non-trceatment 
onsite  landfill
treatment  insitu  treatment
non-excavation
noia-treatment  containmentFIGURE 2:  IMPLICIT VALUATION OF REMEDIAL OPTIONS
WITII  RESPECT  TO NON-EXCAVATION  OPTION
( model specificationi  (2))
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